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Hudson v. McMillian: The Eighth Amendment
Gets a Push and a Shove
The mood and temper of the public in regard to the treatment of
crime and criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of the
civilisation of any country. A calm and dispassionate recognition
of the rights of the accused against the State, and even of con-
victed criminals against the State... and an unfaltering faith that
there is a treasure, if you can only find it, in the heart of every
man-these are the symbols which in the treatment of crime and
criminals mark and measure the stored-up strength of a nation,
and are the sign and proof of the living virtue in it.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Until the middle of the twentieth century, prisoners in the
United States were regarded as slaves of the state, persons who had
forfeited not only their liberty but all of their personal and consti-
tutional rights, 2 persons who could be punished at the discretion of
prison officials "by stripes, or the iron mask, or the gag, or the
dungeon."3 Acting under the judiciary's commitment to what be-
came known as the "hands-off" doctrine,4 federal courts refused to
accept jurisdiction over complaints of convicts who challenged the
actions of prison officials. 5 The judiciary attributed its hands-off
1. Winston S. Churchill, Domestic Affairs (Home Office Vote) (July 20, 1910), in 2
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: His COMPLETE SPEECHES 1897-1963 1598 (Robert Rhodes
James ed., 1974).
2. See, e.g., Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790 (1871). Excluding pris-
oners from the protection of the Virginia Bill of Rights, the Virginia Supreme Court
stated:
A convicted felon, whom the law in its humanity punishes by confinement in
the penitentiary instead of with death . . . is for the time being the slave of the
State. He is civiliter mortuus; and his estate, if he has any, is administered like
that of a dead man. The bill of rights is a declaration of general principles to
govern a society of freemen, and not of convicted felons and men civilly dead.
Id. at 795-96.
3. Id. at 796.
4. One court justified the hands-off doctrine by stating that "courts have no function
to superintend the treatment of prisoners in the penitentiary, but only to deliver from
prison those who are illegally detained there." Sarshik v. Sanford, 142 F.2d 676 (5th Cir.
1944) (per curiam).
5. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knight v. Ragen, 337 F.2d 425, 426 (7th Cir. 1964)
(per curiam) (noting that state penitentiary issues are the sole concern of the state and
would be addressed by federal courts only under exceptional circumstances), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 985 (1965); Kirby v. Thomas, 336 F.2d 462, 464 (6th Cir. 1964) (finding that
federal courts do not have authority to regulate ordinary internal management and disci-
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attitude to a lack of expertise in penology, 6 a tradition of deference
to the authority of prison officials, and a lack of federal remedies.'
In the 1960s, because courts and commentators realized that inade-
quate prison conditions demanded some intervention8 and because
section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act 9 emerged as an effective rem-
pline of prisons); Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851-52 (9th Cir.) (holding that "it is not
the function of the courts to superintend the treatment and discipline of prisoners"), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 829 (1951).
6. Penology is defined as "[tihe science of prison management and rehabilitation of
criminals." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1134 (6th ed. 1990).
7. For a thorough analysis of the hands-off doctrine, see David J. Gottlieb, The Leg-
acy of Wolfish and Chapman: Some Thoughts About "Big Prison Case" Litigation in the
1980s, in 1 PRISONERS AND THE LAW 2-3 to 2-4 (Ira P. Robbins ed., 1990) [hereinafter
Gottlieb] (noting that the reasons for the hands-off doctrine include the theory that pris-
oners are slaves of the state, the demands of federalism and separation of powers, lack of
judicial expertise in prison affairs, a lack of federal remedies, the potential for a flood of
litigation, and the need to conserve financial resources). For a different perspective, see
Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the
Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 508-09 (1963) (arguing that the courts' nonin-
tervention cannot be attributed to the limitations of remedies, but instead can be ex-
plained by the courts' unquestioning acceptance of the assertion that judicial scrutiny will
subvert the authority and independence of prison officials and the discipline of prisons).
8. See Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 680 (N.D. Cal. 1966). The court
stated:
[]hen ... the responsible prison authorities ... have abandoned elemental
concepts of decency by permitting conditions to prevail of a shocking and de-
based nature, then the courts must intervene--and intervene promptly-to re-
store the primal rules of a civilized community in accord with the mandate of
the Constitution of the United States.
Id.; see also Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 684 (D. Mass.
1973) (noting that "the soul-chilling inhumanity of conditions in American prisons has
been thrust upon the judicial conscience"). See generally Joseph C. Kearfott, Note, De-
cency and Fairness: An Emerging Judicial Role in Prison Reform, 57 VA. L. REV. 841,
884 (1971) ("[P]risoners possess the constitutional right to fairness and decency in their
treatment and.., if no other body will ensure this right, the courts will stand ready to do
so. No less can be expected of our judicial system."); Eugene N. Barkin, The Emergence
of Correctional Law and the Awareness of the Rights of the Convicted, 45 NEB. L. REV.
669, 673 (1966) (advocating that "a prisoner should not be stripped of any rights other
than those which would be detrimental to the administration and discipline of the institu-
tion"); Martin W. Spector, Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law,
110 U. PA. L. REV. 985, 985 (1962) (stating that incarceration "does not preclude recog-
nition by the courts of a duty to protect the prisoner from unlawful and onerous
treatment").
9. The relevant portion of § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
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edy,1° courts began to scrutinize the treatment of prisoners.
Inroads into the hands-off policy began with the recognition of
prisoners' rights on well-established constitutional grounds: the
right to freedom of religion," the right not to be racially segre-
gated, 12 and the right of access to the courts.13 In 1966, for the first
time, a federal court granted a prisoner relief'4 on the ground that
the conditions of his confinement constituted cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United
10. In the 1960s, prisoners gained substantial access to federal courts through the
decisions of the Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), and Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Monroe expanded the availability of § 1983 to claims
against officials who, clothed with the authority of state law, misuse their power to de-
prive individuals of constitutional rights. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 185-87. Robinson ex-
tended the applicability of the Eighth Amendment to the states via the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666-67; see also Gottlieb,
supra note 7, at 2-5 (discussing the Supreme Court's revival of the Civil Rights Act and
the use of the Act to encompass abuse of state-delegated authority within federal court
jurisdiction under § 1983); James Rosenzweig, State Prison Conditions and the Eighth
Amendment: What Standard for Reform Under Section 1983?, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
411, 428 (1987) (noting that "[p]rison reform suits are a modern phenomenon").
11. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906, 912 (2d Cir.) (requiring state authori-
ties to alter rules "insofar as possible within the limits of prison discipline" to minimize
interference with the rights of prisoners to practice their Muslim religion), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 892 (1964); Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196, 198 (4th Cir. 1961) (granting
prisoners a hearing on their request for injunctive relief against alleged discriminatory
treatment based solely on religious beliefs); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370, 379
(D.D.C. 1962) (holding that a prisoner "is not to be discriminated against because of his
religion").
In each of the two prison cases involving religious rights, the Court recognized the
prisoners' rights. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that a
Buddhist prisoner must be afforded a "reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith com-
parable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious
precepts"); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam) (holding that a prisoner's
claim that he was denied access to religious literature stated a cause of action under
§ 1983).
12. See Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (per curiam) (holding Alabama
statutes requiring racial segregation in prisons unconstitutional).
13. See, e.g., Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (per curiam) (holding that
states have an affirmative constitutional duty to furnish inmates with law libraries or with
professional or quasi-professional legal assistance); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485
(1969) (holding that prison officials may not prevent inmates from helping other inmates
with habeas corpus petitions unless the state provides constitutionally adequate alterna-
tive access to courts); Exparte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 548- 49 (1941) (striking down a regula-
tion prohibiting prisoners from filing legal documents without prescreening by prison
officials).
14. Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966). The court granted the
inmate injunctive relief, holding that 12 consecutive days of solitary confinement in a
"strip" cell as a sanction for misconduct constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
at 683-84. The cell was approximately six feet by eight, had no furnishings except a
toilet, had no interior source of light, was not cleaned regularly, and contained no means
for the prisoner to clean himself. Id. at 676-77.
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States Constitution.' 5 Two years later, in the landmark case of
Jackson v. Bishop,16 the Eighth Circuit declared the practice of
whipping prisoners unconstitutional. 7 In 1974, after years of pris-
oners' rights litigation in the lower federal courts, the Supreme
Court repudiated the hands-off policy" and .announced that
"[t]here is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the
prisons of this country."' 9 Finally, in 1976, in Estelle v. Gamble,2"
the Court considered the applicability of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause in the prison context for the first time.
Beginning with its Estelle decision, the Supreme Court has at-
tempted to define appropriate legal standards to determine whether
prisoners' deprivations constitute "cruel and unusual punish-
ments" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.2 In 1991, in Wil-
son v. Seiter,22 the Court clarified its Eighth Amendment doctrine
by expressly dividing the analysis of all prisoners' claims into ob-
jective and subjective components. 3
On the basis of the two-prong analysis established in Wilson, the
15. The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII (emphasis added). The language of the Eighth Amendment manifests "an intention
to limit the power of those entrusted with the criminal-law function of government."
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977). Thus, the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause applies "only after the State has complied with the constitutional guaran-
tees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions." Id. at 671 n.40 (citing United
States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 317-18 (1946)).
16. 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
17. Id. at 579. Justice Blackmun, then serving on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, wrote: "Corporal punishment generates hate toward the keepers who
punish and toward the system which permits it. It is degrading to the punisher and to the
punished alike.... Whipping creates other penological problems and makes adjustment
to society more difficult." Id. at 580. See generally Comment, The Role of the Eighth
Amendment in Prison Reform, 38 U. CHi. L. REv. 647, 658 (1971) (noting that "Jackson
departed from the mainstream").
18. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). The Court stated: "When a prison
regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will
discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights." Id. at 405-06, overruled on other
grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). See generally Kenneth C. Haas,
Judicial Politics and Correctional Reform: An Analysis of the Decline of the "Hands-Off'
Doctrine, 1977 DET. C.L. Rnv. 795 (1977) (examining both the major justifications of the
hands-off doctrine and the legal arguments that undermine barriers to judicial review of
the constitutionality of prison life).
19. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974). In Wolff, the Court held that
certain minimum due process protections must be provided if a disciplinary hearing could
deprive a prisoner of good time credits or result in disciplinary segregation. Id. at 557-58.
20. 429 U.S. 97 (1976); see also infra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
22. 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
23. See infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
Hudson v. McMillian
Court decided Hudson v. McMillian24 on February 25, 1992. In
Hudson, the Court ruled that the beating of a prisoner by prison
guards violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause even
though the lower court had found that the prisoner had not suf-
fered a "significant injury. ' 25 The decision also established that
inmates must demonstrate that prison officials acted with "mali-
cious and sadistic" intent in order to establish an Eighth Amend-
ment excessive-force violation.26 The Hudson decision stirred
considerable controversy and received extensive press coverage,27
largely because of the dissenting opinion in which Justice Thomas,
joined only by Justice Scalia, argued that Hudson extended Eighth
Amendment protection "beyond all reasonable limits. ' 2
This Note juxtaposes the opinions in Hudson against the analyti-
cal framework of recent Eighth Amendment prison cases decided
by the Supreme Court. It begins by tracing early interpretations of
the Eighth Amendment and identifying the development of the
analysis that led to the formulation of the standards announced in
Hudson.29 The Note then presents the facts of Hudson and dis-
cusses the holdings of the Court and the issues raised by the dis-
sent.30 Finally, the Note analyzes the reasoning of the majority,
evaluates the criticisms of the dissent, and reaches two conclu-
sions:3  First, the majority properly rejected the notion that a pris-
oner must show significant injury in order to satisfy the objective
component in Eighth Amendment excessive-force cases. Second,
the majority erred in ruling that prisoners must show that their
24. 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).
25. Id. at 1000. This holding refers to the "objective component" of the test formu-
lated in Wilson.
26. Id. at 999. This holding refers to the "subjective component" of the test formu-
lated in Wilson.
27. See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett, Beating of Inmate Is Found to Violate Ban on Cruel
and Unusual Punishment, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 1992, at B8 ("Justice Thomas... urges
an extremely narrow view of constitutional protections."); Linda Greenhouse, Justice
Thomas Hits the Ground Running, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1992, § 4, at 1. Greenhouse
reported:
[T]here were two important themes in Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion in
... Hudson v. McMillian. One was the emphasis on the original understanding
of the Constitution's framers as the only valid measure of the document's mean-
ing today.... The other theme was the willingness to discard precedents in
which the Court departed from the search for the original understanding.
Id.
28. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1010 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
29. See infra part II.
30. See infra part III.
31. See infra parts IV and V.
19931
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abusers acted with malicious and sadistic intent in order to satisfy
the subjective component.
II. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court's analysis in Hudson was rooted in the
Court's earlier interpretations of the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause in nonprison contexts. This section summarizes (1)
the development of Eighth Amendment doctrine outside of the
prison context prior to Estelle v. Gamble32 and (2) the development
of Eighth Amendment standards within the prison context from
Estelle to Wilson v. Seiter,33 in which the Court divided its analysis
into objective and subjective components34 and thus cast the mold
for all subsequent Eighth Amendment claims by prisoners.
A. The Eighth Amendment
Before the 1970s, the Supreme Court took few opportunities to
review or define "cruel and unusual punishment. ' 3  For example,
it was not until 1972, in Furman v. Georgia,36 that the Court con-
sidered the constitutionality of the death penalty. In early Eighth
Amendment cases, the Court had focused on particular methods of
execution,37 on challenges to the relative harshness of sentences
32. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
33. 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
34. See infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
35. For a history of pre-1972 applications of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 264-69 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring);
see also Note, What Is Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 24 HARV. L. REV. 54, 56 (1910)
("[C]ourts have considered not only the kind and degree of punishment and the magni-
tude of the crime, but the special conditions in a particular locality, and even the customs
and beliefs of a particular class of individuals .... ").
36. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Furman held that although the death penalty is not per se
unconstitutional, statutes that leave juries with untrammeled discretion to impose or
withhold the death penalty violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. 408 U.S.
at 253-57. In concurring opinions, Justice Brennan recognized that "death is . . . an
unusually severe punishment, unusual in its pain, in its finality, and in its enormity," id.
at 287 (Brennan, J., concurring), and Justice Douglas condemned the arbitrariness and
capriciousness in sentencing procedures. Id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
37. See, e.g., In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890). The Kemmler Court upheld a
New York statute requiring execution by electrocution, deferring to the state legislature's
finding that this method was "the most humane and practical method known to modern
science of carrying into effect the sentence of death in capital cases." Id. at 444. Declar-
ing that a judicial duty to adjudge penalties under the Eighth Amendment arose only
when criminal punishments "were manifestly cruel and unusual, as burning at the stake,
crucifixion, breaking on the wheel, or the like," the Court stated: "Punishments are cruel
when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel,
within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. It implies there something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life." Id. at
1993] Hudson v. McMillian
other than death,38 and on the implications of the Eighth Amend-
ment for persons punished solely because of their status or
condition.39
In 1958, in Trop v. Dulles,40 the Court first recognized that an
Eighth Amendment violation can occur without physical punish-
ment. Confronted with a challenge to the penalty of denationaliza-
tion for one day of wartime desertion, the Trop Court
acknowledged that although it was difficult to articulate an exact
or exhaustive definition of "cruel and unusual punishment,"'4' the
basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is "nothing less
447 (citing Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878)). In Wilkerson, the Court upheld
execution by firing squad on the ground that it did not involve the kind of torture as that
in which the criminal "was embowelled alive, beheaded, and quartered," or cases "of
public dissection ... and burning alive." 99 U.S. at 135-36.
38. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); see also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349 (1910). Stating that "it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be
graduated and proportioned to [the] offense," id. at 367, the Weems Court overturned a
12-to-20 year sentence of hard and painful labor in ankle and wrist chains, imposed for
the crime of falsifying public records, finding it cruel in its excessiveness and unusual in
its character. Id. at 380-82. The Court reaffirmed the principle of proportionality of
sentencing in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("[Tihe
Eighth Amendment bars not only those punishments that are 'barbaric' but also those
that are 'excessive' in relation to the crime committed.").
The Court, however, has been reluctant to conclude that individual sentences or multi-
ple charges constitute cruel and unusual punishments. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan,
111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991) (upholding a mandatory life sentence without possibility of parole
given to a first-time offender for possession of cocaine); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370
(1982) (per curiam) (reversing a grant of habeas corpus relief to a prisoner sentenced to
40 years imprisonment and a $20,000 fine for possession with intent to distribute less that
nine ounces of marijuana); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (upholding the appli-
cation of a Texas recidivist statute that imposed a mandatory life sentence for a third
property-related offense); Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916) (upholding a
sentence of five years' imprisonment and a fine of $7,000 for mailing seven letters in
attempted mail fraud). See generally Marc A. Paschke, Harmelin v. Michigan: Punish-
ment Need Not Fit the Crime, 23 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 273, 307 (1992) (concluding that the
Court has "eviscerated the meaning and effect of the Eighth Amendment with respect to
the proportionality principle in noncapital cases").
39. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Invalidating a statute that
criminalized drug addiction, the Court stated: "The addict is a sick person.... We
would forget the teachings of the Eighth Amendment if we allowed sickness to be made a
crime .... This age of enlightenment cannot tolerate such barbarous action." Id. at 676-
78 (Douglas, J., concurring). The Court refused to extend this rationale when asked to
invalidate the conviction of alcoholics for public drunkenness. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S.
514 (1968) (holding that because the statute criminalized the behavior of public intoxica-
tion, not the status of being an alcoholic, it did not violate the Eighth Amendment).
40. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). In holding the penalty of denationalization cruel and unu-
sual, the Court warned that "the existence of the death penalty is not a license to the
Government to devise any punishment short of death within the limit of its imagination."
Id. at 99.
41. Id. at 88-89. The Court had identified this challenge earlier in Wilkerson. 99
U.S. at 130 ("Difficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the
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than the dignity of man.''42 The Court noted that although states
have the power to punish, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause assures that states will exercise their power within civilized
limits. 43 Thus, a state may punish criminals by imposing fines or
by sentencing them to imprisonment or even execution, but "any
technique outside the bounds of these traditional penalties is con-
stitutionally suspect." 44 The Trop Court concluded that Eighth
Amendment doctrine should evolve in a flexible and dynamic man-
ner,45 drawing its meaning "from the evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of a maturing society.""
In the 1970s, the Court relied on its decision in Trop to extend
Eighth Amendment protection to punishments47 that, although not
physically barbarous, involve the "unnecessary and wanton inflic-
tion of pain."' 48 Such punishments include not only those meted
out by judges or legislatures but also those that are "totally with-
out penological justification. '49
constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be
inflicted ....").
42. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 100-01. As early as 1910, the Court had noted that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause is "progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
46. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. This formulation informed Justice Blackmun's decision in
Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968), see also supra notes 16-17 and accompa-
nying text. In concluding that the practice of whipping prisoners violated the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, Justice Blackmun wrote: "[W]e have a flat recognition
that the limits of the Eighth Amendment's proscription are not easily or exactly defined,
and we also have clear indications that the applicable standards are flexible.., that broad
and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency are useful
and usable." Jackson, 404 F.2d at 579.
47. Prior to the 1970s, every Supreme Court decision striking down a punishment on
Eighth Amendment grounds concerned a legislative act. See supra notes 10-13 and ac-
companying text.
48. The Court first articulated this standard in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)
(joint opinion). In concluding that the Georgia death penalty statute comported with the
Eighth Amendment, the Court stated:
When a form of punishment in the abstract ... rather than in the particular...
is under consideration, the inquiry into "excessiveness" has two aspects. First,
the punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.
Second, the punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of
the crime.
Id. at 173 (citations omitted).
49. Id. at 183; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
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B. Eighth Amendment Standards Within the Prison Context
As a logical consequence of its extension of Eighth Amendment
protection to cover penologically unjustified infliction of pain, the
Court acknowledged that because confinement itself is punishment,
the conditions of confinement are subject to scrutiny under Eighth
Amendment standards.50 An overarching principle emerged:
although a prisoner is placed in government custody, the Eighth
Amendment does not permit the government to mistreat the
prisoner.
Beginning with its first Eighth Amendment decision in the
prison context,5 the Supreme Court has struggled to establish ap-
propriate legal standards to determine whether the deprivations
that prisoners suffer constitute "cruel and unusual punishments."52
Having determined that the test for Eighth Amendment claims is
whether the state has inflicted pain that is unnecessary and wan-
ton, 53 the Court divided this test into two parts: Prisoners must
satisfy (1) an "objective component" by demonstrating that they
suffered an injury of sufficient severity, and (2) a "subjective com-
ponent" by proving that the prison officials inflicting the abuse ac-
ted with the requisite intent.54 Depending on the context of the
alleged Eighth Amendment violation, the Court has adopted differ-
ent standards in applying this test.55 In formulating these stan-
dards, the Court has stressed that deference should be shown to the
judgments of state legislatures and prison officials.5 6 Some of the
commentators who have examined the policies that have shaped
50. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978). By upholding remedial or-
ders entered by the district court to correct unconstitutional conditions in the Arkansas
prison system, the Court acknowledged that confinement conditions are subject to Eighth
Amendment standards. See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). Ingraham
involved the question of whether corporal punishment in a public school constituted
cruel and unusual punishment. The Court held that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause does not apply to disciplinary corporal punishment in public schools. Id. at 683.
In distinguishing a prisoner from a schoolchild, the Court stated: "Prison brutality... is
'part of the total punishment to which the individual is being subjected for his crime and,
as such, is a proper subject for Eighth Amendment scrutiny.' " Id. at 669 (quoting Ingra-
ham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 915 (5th Cir. 1976)).
51. Estelle, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); see also infra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 58-87 and accompanying text.
53. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 58-87 and accompanying text.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1986) (noting that neither
judge nor jury should freely substitute its judgment for the considered choice of prison
officials); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981) (commenting that courts dele-
gate the duty of dealing with prison discomfort to legislatures and prison administra-
tions); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979) (warning that many federal courts have
1993]
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the Court's decisions have characterized them as signaling a return
to the hands-off doctrine. 57
In Estelle v. Gamble,58 the Supreme Court first applied the
Eighth Amendment to alleged deprivations that were not part of
the prisoner's judicially imposed sentence, but which the prisoner
had suffered during imprisonment. Inmate Gamble claimed that
the inadequate medical care he had received for a back injury.sus-
tained while doing prison work amounted to cruel and unusual
punishment." The Court concluded that the appropriate legal
standard for establishing whether the plaintiff had suffered an un-
necessary and wanton infliction of pain 6° was whether the officers
exhibited "deliberate indifference" to the serious medical needs of
the prisoner. 6' Although the deliberate-indifference standard did
"in the name of the Constitution, become increasingly enmeshed in minutiae of prison
operations").
57. See, e.g., James E. Robertson, The Role of Ideology in Prisoners' Rights Adjudica-
tion: Habilitative Prison Conditions and the Eighth Amendment, 1984 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
271. In discussing the role of penal ideologies in shaping the adjudication of prisoners'
rights, the author wrote:
The lower federal courts stood at the forefront of the judiciary's reform of the
nation's jails and prisons. Hardly any aspect of prisoner life was considered to
be beyond the ken of these courts during the 1970's [sic]. For a time, the
Supreme Court accepted the views of the lower federal courts .... However, in
recent years, this trend has been reversed as the Court has attempted to erect a
new hands-off doctrine through a policy of broad deference to the conduct of
correctional officials.
Id. at 279-80 (footnotes omitted); see also Mark Berger, Withdrawal of Rights and Due
Deference: The New Hands Off Policy in Correctional Litigation, 47 UMKC L. REV. 1, 5
(1978) (stating that "[t]he developments in correctional litigation over the last decade
demonstrate that the initial impetus toward wide-ranging reform of correctional law has
given way to something akin to a holding action").
58. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
59. Id. at 98. Gamble was injured when a bale of cotton weighing 600 pounds fell on
him while he was unloading a truck. Id. at 99 n.3. Subsequently, medical personnel saw
him on 17 occasions for treatment of his back injury, high blood pressure, and heart
problems. Id. at 107. He complained that physicians should have done more for the
diagnosis and treatment of his back injury, contending that they did not pursue certain
diagnostic techniques, such as taking an X-ray of his lower back. Id.
60. Subsequently, the Court interpreted Estelle in dictum in Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651, 670 (1977), to mean that "after incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain" would transgress the Eighth Amendment. This dictum has been fol-
lowed in all subsequent Supreme Court Eighth Amendment cases.
61. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05 (citations omitted). Relying on Louisiana ex rel. Fran-
cis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) as support for this subjective component, the Court
stated: "An accident, although it may produce added anguish, is not on that basis alone
to be characterized as wanton infliction of unnecessary pain." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.
In Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464, the Court concluded that executing a prisoner by a
second electrocution after a mechanical malfunction had thwarted the first attempt did
not violate the Eighth Amendment. Central to the Court's reasoning was the uninten-
tional failure of the first attempt. In finding no cruelty "in the constitutional sense," the
19931 Hudson v. McMillian
not require proof that prison officials had acted with express intent
to inflict unnecessary pain,62 the Court found that an inadvertent
failure to provide adequate medical care did not constitute wanton-
ness and did not offend societal standards of decency.63
In addition to this subjective component, the standard required
the prisoner to prove that the acts or omissions of prison officials
caused him sufficient harm. 64 The Court later referred to this re-
quirement as the "objective component" of Eighth Amendment
analysis. 65
The Court's subsequent decision in Rhodes v. Chapman66 turned
on this objective component alone. In Rhodes, inmates contended
that the confinement of two inmates in a single cell constituted
cruel and unusual punishment.67  Rejecting their contention, the
Court concluded that although double celling might cause pain,6 s
it is not unnecessary and wanton pain.69 The Court did not ad-
dress the subjective intent of the prison officials who instituted the
double celling. 70
Court focused not on the prisoner's suffering but rather on the unforeseeability of the
"accident" which "prevented the prompt consummation of the sentence." Id.
62. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. The Court stated that the deliberate-indifference
standard applies "whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their re-
sponse to the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying
access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
63. Id. at 105-06 (citations omitted). The Court explained that under this standard, a
complaint of medical negligence did not state a valid claim under the Eighth Amend-
ment. Id. at 106.
64. Id.
65. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 339 (1981).
66. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
67. Id. at 339.
68. Id. at 349. This statement was an apparent concession to the findings of several
detailed studies on which the district court had relied to conclude that for inmates serv-
ing long sentences, less than 50-55 square feet of living space constituted cruel and unu-
sual punishment. Id. at 348. However, dismissing the lower court's considerations as
reflecting "an aspiration toward an ideal environment for long-term confinement," Jus-
tice Powell's majority opinion stated that "the Constitution does not mandate comforta-
ble prisons." Id. at 349.
69. Id. at 346. The Court held that only those deprivations that deny prisoners "the
minimal civilized measure of life's necessities" are sufficiently grave to form the basis of
an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. at 347. Justice Powell's majority opinion stated:
"[C]onditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under contemporary standards
[of decency] are not unconstitutional. To the extent that such conditions are restrictive
and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses
against society." Id.
70. Not only did the Court not consider the intent of prison officials, but referring to
its earlier assessments of death penalty statutes as support, Justice Powell asserted thatjudgments about punishments "should be informed by objective factors to the maximum
possible extent." Id. at 346 (citations omitted).
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However, in Whitley v. Albers,71 the Court made it clear that its
decision in Rhodes had not eliminated the subjective component.
In Whitley, the conduct challenged was a correctional officer's
shooting of inmate Albers in the leg during a prison riot as Albers
ran up a stairway to his cell. 72 Relying on the Estelle holding that
negligence alone does not suffice to establish an Eighth Amend-
ment claim, the Court concluded that any official conduct that
does not purport to be punishment "must involve more than the
ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety. '73
The Court held that the meaning ascribed to the general require-
ment that an Eighth Amendment claimant allege and prove unnec-
essary and wanton infliction of pain 74 is not fixed, but varies
according to the type of conduct alleged.75 Reaffirming that "de-
liberate indifference" is the appropriate standard for claims of in-
adequate medical care, the Court concluded that claims of
excessive force in the context of a prison riot require a more strin-
gent standard.76 In the latter category of cases, the appropriate
inquiry is whether the officers applied force in good faith to main-
tain or restore discipline or whether they applied force maliciously
and sadistically to cause harm.77
71. 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
72. Id. at 316. Inmates at the Oregon State Penitentiary held a prison officer hostage
in the upper tier of a two-tier cellblock. Id. at 314-15. Although Albers had not been
involved in the riot and had instead attempted to help, an officer shot him pursuant to an
order from the security manager to "shoot low" at any inmates climbing the stairs to the
upper tier. Id. at 325. Because the officer was unaware that Albers presented no security
risk, and moreover, because the officer was following orders, the Court concluded that
the shooting was "part and parcel of a good-faith effort to restore prison security." Id. at
325-26.
73. Id. at 319. To emphasize that the prisoner's injury did not in itself establish cruel
and unusual punishment, the Court stated in dictum that "obduracy and wantonness, not
inadvertence or error in good faith," implicate the Eighth Amendment. Id. The Court
explained that this general state of mind characterizes conduct prohibited by the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause whether the conduct "occurs in connection with estab-
lishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring official control
over a tumultuous cellblock." Id.
74. Id. at 319. The Court relied on its dictum in Ingraham for this general require-
ment. See supra note 60.
75. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 320-21 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414.U.S. 1033 (1973)). In Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033, the Second Circuit held
that a pretrial detainee's complaint that a guard attacked him without provocation stated
a cognizable due process claim under § 1983. Quoting Johnson, the Whitley Court stated:
Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of
the judge's chambers, violates a prisoner's constitutional rights. In determining
whether the constitutional line has been crossed, a court must look to such
factors as the need for the application of force, the relationship between the
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Explaining its departure from the deliberate-indifference stan-
dard, the Whitley Court reasoned that because a riot threatens
prison security, analysis of the force used during a riot requires a
court to balance the officials' penological interest in the protection
of staff and inmates against the risk of injury to prisoners.78 The
Court concluded that courts must therefore grant prison adminis-
trators considerable deference in the choice of procedures that they
implement to preserve order and discipline and to maintain secur-
ity. 79 In contrast, deliberate indifference to a prisoner's illness re-
quires no balancing of competing institutional concerns because
the state's responsibility to provide prisoners with medical care
does not clash with other equally important governmental
responsibilities.80
In Wilson v. Seiter,s' the Court extended the Estelle deliberate-
indifference standard to challenges to general conditions of confine-
ment82 and formally divided the Eighth Amendment into subjec-
tive and objective components. Rejecting the inmate's argument
that individual acts, such as shooting a prisoner or denying medi-
cal care, are distinguishable from general conditions of confine-
ment, the Court posited that both situations require a showing that
harm constitutes punishment.8 3 The Court then concluded that
unless punishment is formally meted out as a criminal sentence, an
element of intent must be attributed to the inflicting officer or insti-
tution before punishment can qualify as an Eighth Amendment vi-
olation.s4 For challenges to general conditions of confinement, the
need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury inflicted, and
whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline
or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.
Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21. See generally Kathryn R. Urbonya, Establishing a Depriva-
tion of a Constitutional Right to Personal Security Under Section 1983: The Use of Unjus-
tified Force by State Officials in Violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, 51 ALB. L. REV. 171, 212-29 (1987) (describing the development and ap-
plication of the wantonness standard to prisoners' Eighth Amendment claims).
78. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320.
79. Id. at 321-22. However, the Court made it clear that such deference does not
insulate from review actions taken in bad faith and for no legitimate purpose. Id. at 322.
80. Id. at 320.
81. 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
82. In particular, the plaintiff's complaint in Wilson alleged "overcrowding, excessive
noise, insufficient locker storage space, inadequate heating and cooling, improper ventila-
tion, unclean and inadequate restrooms, unsanitary dining facilities and food preparation,
and housing with mentally and physically ill inmates." Id. at 2323.
83. Id. at 2325.
84. Id. As support, the Court quoted Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit:
The infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise or deter....
[I]f [a] guard accidentally stepped on [a] prisoner's toe and broke it, this would
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Court found deliberate indifference to be a more appropriate mea-
sure for the defendant's intent than the more demanding standard
prescribed by Whitley. s5 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
emphasized that the wantonness of conduct does not depend upon
its effect on the prisoner.86 Rather, assuming that conduct is harm-
ful enough to satisfy the objective component, wantonness depends
"upon the constraints facing the official."' 7
III. HUDSON V. MCMILLIAN
On the basis of the Eighth Amendment doctrine developed in
Estelle,8 8 Rhodes, 89 Whitley,90 and Wilson,91 the Supreme Court de-
cided Hudson v. McMillian.92 The issue before the Court was
whether a prisoner who claimed that he was subjected to cruel and
unusual punishment as a result of a single incident of force must
show that he suffered a "significant injury" to state a cognizable
Eighth Amendment claim.93 A majority of the Court concluded
that although a prisoner need not prove that he suffered a signifi-
not be punishment in anything remotely like the accepted meaning of the word,
whether we consult the usage of 1791, or 1868, or 1985.
Id. (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 816 (1986)). However, in the intervening passage, Judge Posner had acknowledged:
"If a guard decided to supplement a prisoner's official punishment by beating him, this
would be punishment, and 'cruel and unusual' because the Supreme Court has inter-
preted the term to forbid unauthorized and disproportionate as well as barbarous, punish-
ments." Franzen, 780 F.2d at 652 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664-67
(1977).
85. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2326-27.
86. Id. at 2326.
87. Id. The Court stated that only the deprivation of "a single, identifiable human
need such as food, warmth, or exercise" would satisfy the objective component of an
Eighth Amendment violation. Id. at 2327.
88. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
89. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
90. 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
91. 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
92. 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).
93. Id. at 996. The Court granted certiorari limited to the following question: "Did
the Fifth Circuit apply the correct legal test to determine that petitioner's claim that his
Eighth Amendment rights under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause were not
violated as a result of a single incident of force by the respondents which did not cause a
significant injury?" Hudson v. McMillian, 111 S. Ct. 1679, 1680 (1991).
The Court appointed Alvin Bronstein of the National Prison Project of the American
Civil Liberties Union to serve as counsel for the petitioner. Id. at 1679. The Bush admin-
istration filed an amicus brief in support of Hudson. See Brief for the United States as
amicus curiae supporting Petitioner, Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992) (No.
90-6531). John G. Roberts, Jr., Deputy Solicitor General, shared time for oral argument
with Hudson's counsel. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Hudson (No. 90-6531) [here-
inafter Transcript].
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cant injury, he must prove that officials acted with malicious and
sadistic intent.94
A. The Facts and the Lower Court Opinions
In the early morning hours of October 30, 1983, corrections of-
ficers Jack McMillian and Marvin Woods handcuffed and shackled
inmate Keith Hudson and took him from his cell to the adminis-
trative lockdown area of the penitentiary. 95 On the way there,
McMillian punched the inmate in the mouth, eyes, chest, and
stomach while Woods held him in place and kicked and punched
him from behind.9" Arthur Mezo, the supervisor on duty, watched
the beating and told the officers "not to have too much fun."97 The
blows split Hudson's lower lip, loosened his teeth, and cracked his
partial dental plate, rendering it unusable for several months.9
The prisoner also suffered bruises on his body, and bruises and
swelling on his face, mouth, and lip.99
Hudson sued the officers in federal court under section 1983,10°
alleging an Eighth Amendment violation and seeking compensa-
tory damages. 0 1 Finding that McMillian and Woods violated
Hudson's Eighth Amendment rights by using unnecessary force
and that the supervisor expressly condoned the acts,'0 2 the trial
court entered judgment for Hudson and awarded him $800 in
damages. 10 3
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed," holding
that inmates alleging an Eighth Amendment use-of-force violation
must prove: (1) a significant injury (2) resulting directly and only
from unwarranted use of force that was (3) objectively unreasona-
94. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1001.
95. Id. at 997. Hudson was a prisoner at the State Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana.
Id. He had had an exchange of words with the officers and had received two disciplinary
reports. Brief of Petitioner at 3, Hudson (No. 90-6531) [hereinafter Brief of Petitioner].
96. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 997.
97. Id.
98. Id. Respondents referred to the cracking of Hudson's dental plate as "damage to
property and not to the person." Brief of Respondents at 12 n.8, Hudson (No. 90-6531)
[hereinafter Brief of Respondents]. In Hudson's reply brief, he submitted that "cracking
his dental plate by repeatedly punching him in the mouth while he was wearing it consti-
tutes an injury to the person." Reply Brief of Petitioner at 7-8 n.10, Hudson (No. 90-
6531).
99. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 997.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 997-98.
102. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 95, at 4. The trial court opinion is unreported.
Id. at 1.
103. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 998.
104. Hudson v. McMillian, 929 F.2d 1014, 1015 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
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ble and that (4) caused an unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain." 5 Although it agreed with the trial court that the officials
had used unreasonable and excessive force and that they had
caused unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, the Fifth Circuit
nonetheless held that Hudson could not prevail on his Eighth
Amendment claim because he had suffered only "minor" injuries
that required no medical attention.' °6
B. The Opinion of the United States Supreme Court
In a seven-to-two decision,0 7 the Supreme Court reversed the
Fifth Circuit ruling, which required a showing of significant injury
as a prerequisite to an excessive-force claim. 108 With respect to the
objective component, the Court concluded that all but de minimis
uses of force are subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny.l09 In ad-
dition, the Court extended the Whitley subjective standard of "ma-
licious and sadistic" intent to all Eighth Amendment allegations of
excessive physical force.110
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor first explained that
the Whitley subjective standard was designed to protect prison offi-
cials confronting a riot who must make quick, difficult decisions
under tense and uncertain circumstances, and who must therefore
be allowed to balance their concern for maintaining prison security
against the risk of injury to inmates."' Justice O'Connor then
found sufficient similarities between a riot and the "lesser disrup-
tion" in Hudson to justify extending the Whitley subjective stan-
dard to all Eighth Amendment excessive-force claims."' She
contended that both situations require prison officials to act
quickly and decisively, and both implicate the principle that courts
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, Kennedy, and Souter joined and in which Justice Stevens
joined in part. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 997. Justice Stevens filed a separate opinion concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment. Id. Justice Blackmun also filed a separate
concurring opinion, and Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Scalia
joined. Id.
108. Hudson, 929 F.2d at 1015.
109. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1000.
110. Id. at 998-99 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). The
Court stated: "[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force
in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is
that set out in Whitley .... Id.
111. Id. at 998 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320).
112. Id. at 999.
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should defer to prison officials in matters of prison security.' 13 On
this basis, Justice O'Connor concluded that all prisoners claiming
Eighth Amendment excessive-force violations must demonstrate
that the officials acted with malicious and sadistic intent."14
Addressing the objective component, the majority noted that
under the Whitley standard, a finding of less than substantial injury
does not end the inquiry." 5 Other factors include: (1) the need to
apply force, (2) the relationship between that need and the amount
of force used, (3) the question of whether the officials reasonably
perceived the prisoner as threatening, and (4) the question of
whether the officials made any efforts to temper the severity of a
forceful response.' 16
Distinguishing allegations of physical abuse from allegations of
inadequate health care or routine discomfort, the majority stated
that because malicious and sadistic beatings always violate societal
standards of decency, excessive-force claims do not require a show-
ing of significant injury. ' 7 The Court explained that although this
standard excludes de minimis uses of force," 8 Hudson's claim sat-
isfied the objective component because his injuries, though minor,
were caused by force that exceeded the de minimis threshold.' '
113. Id. Although the Court cited cases from five circuits in support of this conten-
tion, in fact, the courts disagreed considerably on this issue. Some courts had applied
Whitley to all prison use-of-force cases. See Miller v. Leathers, 913 F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th
Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1018 (1991); Haynes v. Marshall, 887 F.2d
700, 703 (6th Cir. 1989); Brown v. Smith, 813 F.2d 1187, 1188-89 (11th Cir. 1987).
Other courts had defined "prison disturbance" broadly to include almost any defiance of
authority but had still insisted on proof of an actual security threat at the time force was
used. See, e.g., Stenzel v. Ellis, 916 F.2d 423, 427 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that refusal to
"show skin" while sleeping constituted a disturbance invoking Whitley); Cowans v. Wy-
rick, 862 F.2d 697, 699 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding inmate's refusal to close food slot in his
cell door a disturbance); Bolin v. Black, 875 F.2d 1343, 1350 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that
proof of malice is not required for retaliatory beatings after disturbance has been sup-
pressed), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 993 (1990); Wyatt v. Delaney, 818 F.2d 21, 23 (8th Cir.
1987) (holding that malice need not be alleged if no security need for force existed).
114. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 999.
115. Id.
116. Id. (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321).
117. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1000. "Otherwise," Justice O'Connor contended, "the
Eighth Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or
inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury. Such a result would have
been as unacceptable to the drafters of the Eighth Amendment as it is today." Id.
118. Id. In addition, Justice O'Connor stated: "The Eighth Amendment's prohibi-
tion of 'cruel and unusual' punishment necessarily excludes from constitutional recogni-
tion de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort
'repugnant to the conscience of mankind.'" Id. (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d
1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973) (citations omitted)).
119. Id. Justice O'Connor explicitly declined to address the respondents' argument
that their conduct could not "constitute an Eighth Amendment violation because it was
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C. The Concurring Opinions
Justices Stevens and Blackmun filed separate opinions, concur-
ring with the majority's holding with respect to the objective level-
of-injury component,12 0 but arguing that the majority was unjusti-
fied in extending the Whitley subjective malicious-and-sadistic in-
tent standard to claims lacking the exigent circumstances of a
serious prison disturbance.12 1 Although he agreed with the major-
ity that Hudson's claim satisfied even the more demanding stan-
dard, Justice Stevens contended that courts should apply the less
demanding standard of unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain
to claims involving no risk to institutional security. 22
Justice Blackmun also dismissed the suggestion made by the
prison officials and their amici curiae121 that the need to curb the
number of prisoner complaints in federal courts compelled a "sig-
nificant injury" requirement.' 24  He stressed that inasmuch as a
'isolated and unauthorized.'" Id. at 1001. First, she contended, the Fifth Circuit had
adopted the trial court's determination that the violence at issue was "not an isolated
assault." Id. at 1001-02. Justice O'Connor noted that the record indicated "that McMil-
lian and Woods beat another prisoner shortly after they finished with Hudson." Id. at
1002. Second, the unauthorized nature of the respondents' acts was an issue that was not
addressed by the Fifth Circuit and not related to the question on which the Court granted
certiorari. Id. Moreover, the trial court found that supervisor Mezo had "expressly con-
doned the use of force in this instance." Id.
120. Justice Blackmun contended that a contrary holding would put torture tech-
niques "ingeniously designed to cause pain but without a telltale 'significant injury'-
entirely beyond the pale of the Constitution." Id. at 1002 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
121. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). Justices Stevens and Blackmun joined Justice Mar-
shall's dissent in Whitley. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 328 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
122. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1002. Justice Stevens stated that his approach was consis-
tent with "the Court's admonition in Whitley that the standard to be used is one that
gives 'due regard for differences in the kind of conduct against which an Eighth Amend-
ment objection is lodged.'" Id. (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320); see also supra notes
71-80 and accompanying text. In addition, Justice Stevens cited lower court cases that
applied the standard he deemed appropriate. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1002 (Stevens, J.,
concurring); see, e.g., Unwin v. Campbell, 863 F.2d 124, 135 (1st Cir. 1988) ("[Wlhere
institutional security is not at stake, the officials' license to use force is more limited; to
succeed, a plaintiff need not prove malicious and sadistic intent.").
123. The Attorney General of Louisiana represented the respondents, and the states
of Texas, Hawaii, Nevada, Wyoming, and Florida joined as amici curiae. Hudson, 112 S.
Ct. at 1003 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
124. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). The respondents urged that this method had
proved effective to "control its system-wide docket management problems" in the Fifth
Circuit. Id. Justice Blackmun replied:
This audacious approach to the Eighth Amendment assumes that the interpre-
tation of an explicit constitutional protection is to be guided by pure policy
preferences for the paring down of prisoner petitions .... But this inherently
self-interested concern has no appropriate role in interpreting the contours of a
substantive constitutional right.
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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convict is disenfranchised, the right to file a court action is a most
fundamental right because it provides the means to preserve all
rights. 125
Finally, Justice Blackmun explained that the Hudson decision
did not limit injury cognizable under the Eighth Amendment to
physical injury because the prohibition against unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain includes psychological pain.1 26 Citing
Supreme Court precedent as support for the proposition that psy-
chological pain is cognizable for constitutional purposes, 127 Justice
Blackmun asserted that reading a " 'physical injury' requirement
into the Eighth Amendment would be no less pernicious" than the
significant-injury requirement rejected by the majority.12 8
D. Justice Thomas's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented from both
prongs of the Court's decision. In his view, "a use of force that
causes only insignificant harm to a prisoner may be immoral, it
may be tortious, it may be criminal, and it may even be remediable
under other provisions of the Federal Constitution, but it is not
'cruel and unusual punishment.' "129 Justice Thomas rejected what
125. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun then noted that three meas-
ures already in place provided adequate control of docket management problems caused
by frivolous prisoner claims. First, prisoners, alone among § 1983 claimants, are re-
quired by statute to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit. Id. at 1003-04.
This statement is not entirely accurate because 42 U.S.C § 1997e(a) provides that a fed-
eral district court may continue a state prisoner's § 1983 suit for 90 days to compel the
prisoner to exhaust the internal grievance remedy. The Civil Rights of Institutionalized
Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (1988). Second, prison officials are entitled to a pretrial
ruling on the qualified immunity defense. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1003 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). A court must look to the "objective reasonableness of an official's conduct,
as measured by reference to clearly established law," to determine whether qualified im-
munity applies in the particular case. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)
(citations omitted). Third, federal district courts are authorized to dismiss frivolous or
malicious in forma pauperis complaints. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1003 (Blackmun, J., con-
curring); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) ("The court may request an attorney to represent
any such person unable to employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation of
poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.").
126. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Wisniewski v.
Kennard, 901 F.2d 1276, 1277 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 309 (1990)).
127. Id. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727, 734 (1972) (recognizing Article III standing for "aesthetic" injury); Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (identifying school children's feelings of psycho-
logical inferiority because of segregation in public schools)).
128. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun ac-
knowledged that the Court's opinion intimates that de minimis or nonmeasurable psycho-
logical pain is not actionable under the Eighth Amendment. Id.
129. Id. at 1005 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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he characterized as the majority's broad assertion that any unnec-
essary and wanton use of force against a prisoner, greater than a de
minimis level, is automatically cruel and unusual. 30 He also re-
jected the majority's contention that even a de minimis use of force
inflicts cruel and unusual punishment if it is repugnant to the pub-
lic conscience. 31
Justice Thomas traced the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause back to when it applied only to torturous punishments
meted out by judges or legislatures and when, under the hands-off
doctrine, courts routinely rejected prisoner complaints.' 32 He
noted that when the Court "cut the Eighth Amendment loose from
its historical moorings" by applying it in the prison context for the
first time in Estelle v. Gamble,13 3 the Court made it clear that the
Eighth Amendment plays a very limited role in regulating prison
administration. 3 4 On this basis, he argued, Estelle restricted appli-
cation of the clause to those deprivations that involved serious in-
jury inflicted by prison officials acting with a culpable state of
mind. 135
Noting further that Wilson formally required prisoners to satisfy
both the objective and the subjective components in order to state
an Eighth Amendment claim, Justice Thomas objected to the ma-
jority's failure to extend Wilson's formulation of the objective com-
ponent inquiry: "[W]as the deprivation sufficiently serious?"' 1 36
He claimed, instead, that the Hudson majority erred in eliminating
the objective component altogether by relying on a misreading of
Whitley's assertion that Eighth Amendment standards are
contextual. 37
130. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 1005 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 1005-06 (Thomas, J., dissenting). According to Justice Thomas, the for-
mer interpretation was well grounded in history, in the Eighth Amendment's English
antecedents, and in its adoption by Congress. Id. He added:
Surely prison was not a more congenial place in the early years of the Republic
than it is today; nor were our judges and commentators so naive as to be una-
ware of the often harsh conditions of prison life. Rather, they simply did not
conceive of the Eighth Amendment as protecting inmates from harsh
treatment.
Id.
133. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
134. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1006-07 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 1006 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
136. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2324).
137. Id. at 1008 (Thomas, J., dissenting). This criticism of Justice O'Connor's rea-
soning is curious because she also wrote the majority opinion in Whitley. Whitley, 475
U.S. at 313. Justice Thomas, however, relied on Justice Scalia's interpretation of Whitley
in Wilson to conclude that "Whitley stands for the proposition that, assuming the exist-
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Justice Thomas also found the majority's attempt to distinguish
Hudson from conditions cases unconvincing because he saw no
reason why subjecting a prisoner to a single beating was more of-
fensive than subjecting him to substandard conditions over a long
period of time.13 Similarly, he found the Court's distinction of
Estelle unpersuasive.' 39 Since prisons are meant to "forcibly" de-
tain prisoners, he argued, society has no greater expectations that
prisoners will have unqualified freedom from force than that they
will have unqualified access to health care.'"
Justice Thomas also rejected the majority's reasoning that draw-
ing the line between substantial and insubstantial injury is danger-
ous because diabolic or inhuman treatment might escape proper
classification if the resulting injury does not manifest itself as sub-
stantial. 4 ' Rather, he interpreted the Eighth Amendment as re-
quiring courts to determine which punishments qualify as cruel
and unusual, regardless of the difficulty of such line drawing. 142
ence of an objectively serious deprivation, the culpability of an official's state of mind
depends on the context in which he acts." Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1008 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia wrote in Wilson: "Whitley teaches that, assuming the conduct
is harmful enough to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim,
whether it can be characterized as 'wanton' depends upon the constraints facing the offi-
cial." Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2236 (citation omitted).
138. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1008 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas stated:
I see no reason why our society's standards of decency should be more readily
offended when officials, with a culpable state of mind, subject a prisoner to a
deprivation on one discrete occasion than when they subject him to continuous
deprivations over time. If anything, I would think that a deprivation inflicted
continuously over a long period would be of greater concern to society than a
deprivation inflicted on one particular occasion.
Id. at 1008-09 (footnote omitted).
139. Id. at 1009 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
140. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas concluded his argument with the
following question: "Why should the seriousness of injury matter when doctors mali-
ciously decide not to treat an inmate, but not when guards maliciously decide to strike
him?" Id.
141. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Acknowledging that "there is no conclusive way to
refute the Court's assertions about our society's 'contemporary notions of decency,' "
Justice Thomas repeated Justice Powell's assertion in Rhodes that judgments about pun-
ishments "should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent." Id.
(quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). Justice Thomas contended that torture that has
caused agony without leaving telltale marks or an enduring injury would nonetheless
qualify as substantial, despite its nonphysical or nonenduring nature. Id. As support, he
quoted Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit:
Many things-beating with a rubber truncheon, water torture, electric shock,
incessant noise, reruns of 'Space 1999'-may cause agony as they occur yet
leave no enduring injury. The state is not free to inflict such pains without
cause just so long as it is careful to leave no marks.
Id. (quoting Williams v. Boles, 841 F.2d 181, 183 (7th Cir. 1988)).
142. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1009 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Thus, Justice Thomas contended, the majority's characterization
of the serious-injury requirement as "arbitrary" did not justify sub-
stituting it in one particular context while leaving it intact in
others. 4 3
Concerned about the implications of substituting the objective
component with a "necessity" component, Justice Thomas argued
that Rhodes, for example, would be wrongly decided under Hudson
because its holding rested not on reasoning that double celling was
necessary, but rather on reasoning that double celling did not ob-
jectively qualify as cruel and unusual punishment. 1" According to
Justice Thomas, having the standard based solely on the justifica-
tion for, and the wantonness of, official conduct extended Eighth
Amendment protection beyond reasonable limits.145
In addition to rejecting the majority's decision with respect to
the objective component, Justice Thomas rejected the majority's
simultaneous extension of Whitley's heightened mental-state re-
quirement to all excessive-force cases. '4 6 He reasoned that the ma-
jority's extension of the Whitley standard to cases like Hudson,
which involve no threat to prison security, was unwarranted. 147
Finally, Justice Thomas complained that the majority's expan-
sion of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause "beyond all
bounds of history and precedent" indicated an attitude that the
"Federal Constitution must address all ills in our society" and that
the Eighth Amendment stands as a "National Code of Prison Reg-
ulation."' 14s He defended his view that minor injuries should be
excluded from the ambit of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause by asserting that although he did not consider beating pris-
oners acceptable conduct, he believed that state courts were more
appropriate than federal courts for adjudicating prisoner griev-
ances. 4 9 Justice Thomas urged that Hudson could have sought
143. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 1010 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
145. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 1008 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent criticized the majority's exten-
sion of the Whitley mental-state requirement as an attempt to "compensate for its elimi-
nation of the objective component." Id.
147. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1008 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas contended
that "[t]he use of excessive physical force is by no means invariably (in fact, perhaps not
even predominantly) accompanied by a 'malicious and sadistic' state of mind." Id. He
further stated: "The Court's unwarranted extension of Whitley, I can only suppose, is
driven by the implausibility of saying that minor injuries imposed upon prisoners with
anything less than a 'malicious and sadistic' state of mind can amount to 'cruel and unu-
sual punishment.'" Id.
148. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
149. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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redress for his injuries under state law; and even if available state
remedies were constitutionally inadequate, a claim under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would have appro-
priately limited federal constitutional inquiry." s0
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Objective Component
The majority's approach to the objective prong reflects societal
standards of decency and is analytically sound. Although the
Whitley decision turned on the subjective component alone, the
Hudson opinion logically derives from Whitley and Wilson: while
Eighth Amendment claims require satisfaction of both the objec-
tive and the subjective components, the substantive test for each
component is "contextual and responsive to 'contemporary stan-
dards of decency.' ""5
Hudson presented a unique context for Eighth Amendment
analysis-the gratuitous beating of a handcuffed and shackled pris-
oner. As a matter of common sense, the act of beating a defense-
less and nonthreatening person is unnecessary and wanton,
regardless of the severity of the resulting injury. By questioning
this reasoning on the ground that conditions cases are more perni-
cious because of their frequency,1 5 2 the dissent misconstrues the
context of physical abuse. Although society does not expect that
prisoners will have unqualified access to health care or to any of
"the other measures of life's necessities," society does expect that
prisoners will not be needlessly beaten, regardless of how infre-
quently it occurs.'53
150. Id. at 1010-11 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 1000 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103). Contrary
to Justice Thomas's argument, id. at 1008, Whitley contains no language to suggest that
the inquiry into the culpability of a defendant official must be conditioned upon a pris-
oner's objectively serious deprivation. Instead, Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320, states that the
general Eighth Amendment standard, which requires proof of unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain, should be applied with due regard for differences in the type of conduct
under review.
Moreover, the majority's conclusion is amply justified by Justice Scalia's pronounce-
ment in Wilson that the wantonness of conduct does not depend upon its effect on the
prisoner. See Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2326.
152. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1008-09 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
153. Moreover, as one of Hudson's amici curiae urged, affirmance of a constitutional
standard that tolerates some arbitrary measure of governmental abuse "would bare as
hypocritical pieties decades of American proclamations about the right of every person,
at home and abroad, to be free from violent, physical abuse by government officials."
Brief of Human Rights Watch as amicus curiae supporting Petitioner at 2, Hudson (No.
90-6531).
1993]
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The majority's criticism that the dissent's view denies "the dif-
ference between punching a prisoner in the face and serving him
unappetizing food'" 54 has merit. Justice Thomas's response to this
criticism-that "society... has no expectation that prisoners will
have 'unqualified' freedom from force, since forcibly keeping pris-
oners in detention is what prisons are all about"' 5 5 -fails to distin-
guish between different kinds of force. Given that Hudson was not
beaten for resisting detention, this is a spurious argument.
Similarly, Justice Thomas's concern that the majority's holding
with respect to the injury component will have sweeping implica-
tions on all Eighth Amendment cases is unfounded. The Court has
not hesitated yet to develop standards for Eighth Amendment
prison claims of inadequate medical care, general substandard con-
ditions of confinement, and injury in the context of a prison riot. 156
Furthermore, the dissent's argument that Rhodes would be
wrongly decided under Hudson I 7 ignores the foundation on which
the majority's argument rests, namely that the standards vary ac-
cording to the nature of the alleged violation.5 8 Because Hudson's
excessive-force standard is inapposite to claims alleging substan-
dard conditions or, as in Rhodes, double celling, Justice Thomas's
pronouncement that the elimination of the significant-injury re-
quirement has "extended the Eighth Amendment beyond all rea-
sonable limits" is greatly exaggerated.
The dissent justified its conclusion-that prisoners should not be
protected against nonserious injuries by the Eighth Amendment-
by arguing that Hudson could have sued under state law or if state
remedies were constitutionally inadequate, under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 9 This argument, how-
ever, is unclear because Justice Thomas does not explain whether
the officers violated Hudson's procedural or substantive due pro-
cess rights.160
154. See Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 997.
155. Id. at 1009 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
156. See supra part IIB.
157. See Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1010 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 998; see also Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320.
159. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1010-11 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
160. When an inmate claims either that he has been subjected to a special type of
punishment or to unfavorable conditions to which other inmates have not been subjected,
he raises a procedural due process issue in terms of the administrative procedures by
which he was selected for such punishment. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980)
(requiring a hearing before the transfer of an inmate from a prison to a mental hospital).
However, when the prisoner claims that the conditions of his confinement fall below
constitutionally acceptable standards of decency, he raises an issue that can be analyzed
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and that can also be categorized as a
[Vol. 24
19931 Hudson v. McMillian
Moreover, in Hudson, a procedural due process claim would not
have made sense. Hudson did not claim that he should have been
granted a hearing before being punched in the face. He claimed
that he should never have been beaten. Thus, Hudson's claim can
be examined only under the rubric of substantive due process. 161 A
substantive due process argument, however, would contradict the
Court's precedent. 62 The Court has expressly stated that for pris-
oners, Eighth Amendment protection against excessive force
makes the protection provided by substantive due process redun-
dant. 1 63 Similarly, the Court has repeatedly affirmed that a plain-
tiff claiming a Bill of Rights violation has the right to invoke
section 1983, regardless of the availability of a state remedy.' 6 4
substantive due process issue. For an analysis of substantive and procedural due process
and cruel and unusual punishment principles, see John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan
III, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325
(1979).
161. Respondents conceded that actions by prison officials that cause prisoner injury
may constitute a deprivation of substantive due process rights. Brief of Respondents,
supra note 98, at 42.
162. Both Justice Thomas and the respondents cited Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S.
344, 348 (1986), Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532-34 (1984), and Parratt v. Taylor,
451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981), as support. See Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1011 (Thomas, J., dis-
senting); Brief of Respondents, supra note 98, at 41 n.36.
However, these cases are not analogous to Hudson. Parratt and Palmer dealt specifi-
cally with due process claims involving deprivations of property. In both cases, the Court
held that the existence of an adequate state remedy precludes a procedural due process
claim where a deprivation of property is caused by "random and unauthorized" acts of
state officials, but that this limitation is irrelevant to substantive due process claims. See
Davidson, 474 U.S. at 358. Again, in Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 124-25 (1990), the
Court explicitly stated that the availability of state remedies is irrelevant to substantive
due process claims. See generally Laura Oren, Signing into Heaven: Zinermon v. Burch,
Federal Rights, and State Remedies Thirty Years After Monroe v. Pape, 40 EMORY L.J. 1
(1991).
In Davidson, a prisoner claimed that officials violated his liberty interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment by negligently failing to protect him from another inmate. Da-
vidson, 474 U.S. at 345-46. The Court held that the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, whether procedural or substantive, is not triggered by
the negligence of prison officials. Id. at 348. Hudson made no claim of negligence.
163. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at
327). In Graham, the Court criticized the indiscriminate use of "substantive due pro-
cess" when more specific constitutional provisions apply. Id. at 393-94.
164. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 338 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
In resuscitating the Reconstruction-era civil rights statute in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961), Justice Douglas's majority opinion stated that the purpose of § 1983 was to
provide a federal remedy to supplement any state remedies and that "the latter need not
be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." Id. at 183. Thirty years
after Monroe, despite complaints that federal courts were flooded with § 1983 lawsuits,
the Court reaffirmed Monroe's central principle-that state officials who misuse their
power are subject to federal suit regardless of the availability of state remedies. Zinermon
v. Burch, 494 U.S. at 124-25. In addition, the Court has unequivocally stated that
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Justice Thomas's view appears to illustrate a disdain for the
evolution of Eighth Amendment principles in the prison context.
In essence, by emphasizing the original interpretation given to the
Amendment, Justice Thomas has expressed his preference for the
hands-off doctrine, under which the Eighth Amendment applied
only to measure the severity of sentences and not to assess the
treatment of prisoners. '6 5 Not only does this opinion disregard the
Court's repeated recognition that the meaning of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause evolves over time,'66 but it ignores
the existence of criminal statutes and common-law torts that serve
as objective indicia that society recognizes a difference between
brutality and discomfort. Moreover, other objective indications
validate the Court's standard:'67  numerous states 68 and the fed-
eral government 169 have criminalized brutality by prison guards,
"[flederal courts sit . . . to enforce the constitutional rights of all 'persons,' including
prisoners." Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972).
165. See, e.g., Is Thomas-Scalia Axis Emerging on the Court?, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 9,
1992, at 26. The report stated:
Justice Thomas'[s] analysis is "in part unsound and incorrect and in part
downright scary....
"The scary part is he's putting the Eighth Amendment in a historical
straightjacket, saying the way things were in 1789 is the way they should be
today .. "
Prisons... were not the conventional method of punishment at the time the
Eighth Amendment was drafted....
The system of punishment changes . . . and the rule has to evolve or "the
Constitution would become a dead or silly document."
Id. (partially quoting Professor Lynn S. Branham of Thomas M. Cooley Law School,
immediate past chair of the American Bar Association's Prison and Jail Problems Com-
mittee and a member of the National Commission on Accreditation in Corrections).
166. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) ("The Amendment must draw
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) ("Time works changes,
brings into existence new conditions and purpose .... a principle, to be vital, must be
capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth."); see also supra notes
40-46 and accompanying text.
167. The Court has previously used objective evidence to formulate standards. See,
e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989) (recognizing that "first among the
objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction are statutes
passed by society's elected representatives," the Court examined state statutes regarding
the execution of minors to determine whether there was a national consensus on the
issue); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976) (considering evidence that at least
35 states had enacted death penalty statutes "the most marked indication of society's
endorsement of the death penalty"); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 295 (1972) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring) (noting that several studies revealed the arbitrary and capricious
"selection of criminals for the punishment of death," the Court invalidated state death
penalty laws).
168. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 95, at 21 n. 17 (listing relevant state statutes).
169. Id. at 20-21 n.16 (discussing United States v. Bigham, 812 F.2d 943 (5th Cir.
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and correctional organizations similarly condemn this practice. 170
The majority's argument that standards of decency compel
Eighth Amendment protection of prisoners against torture by
prison officials reflects a rational concern that any line drawing be-
tween minor and substantial injuries would be both difficult and
arbitrary.' 7' Any constitutional line drawing that would permit
prison officials to inflict unnecessary and wanton pain on prisoners
would be indefensible under the Eighth Amendment.
B. The Subjective Component
In contrast with its solid reasoning with respect to the objective
component, the majority's extension of the Whitley subjective stan-
dard to all excessive force cases is not well-reasoned. The major-
ity's analysis rests on the false premise that the officials in Hudson
faced constraints similar to those faced by the officials confronting
the prison riot in Whitley. By failing to recognize the distinction
between the force needed to quell a riot and the force called for in a
noncrisis situation, the majority's logic fails. Because the officers
restrained Hudson with handcuffs and shackles, he presented no
security risk and the trial court found no justification for the use of
1987), in which the Fifth Circuit upheld a prosecution of guards under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-
42 for assaulting prisoners "intentionally and without justification").
170. See Brief of Americans for Effective Law Enforcement as amicus curiae for Re-
spondents at 6, Hudson (No. 90-6531) (stating that the force in this case exceeded gener-
ally accepted professional standards, and citing Mandatory Standard 3-4198,
STANDARDS FOR ADULT CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 64 (3d ed. 1990)); Brief of D.C.
Prisoner's Legal Services Project, Inc., as amicus curiae for Respondents at 37-38, Hud-
son (No. 90-6531) (discussing the Model Sentencing and Corrections Act (U.L.A.) § 4-
104(b)(2) and the STANDARDS FOR ADULT LOCAL DETENTION FACILITIES § 2-5198
(American Correctional Ass'n, 2d ed. 1987)).
171. The Fifth Circuit's application of the significant-injury test to excessive-force
claims yielded bizarre results. For example, in a case in which a police officer had placed
a revolver in a suspect's mouth and threatened to blow his head off, the court found no
constitutional violation because the suspect had suffered no physical injuries. Wisniewski
v. Kennard, 901 F.2d 1276 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 309 (1990).
Criticizing the majority's decision, the dissenting judge wrote: "[A]ccording to the ma-
jority, when the injury vanishes from sight, so does the Fourth Amendment's cloth of
protection." Id. at 1280 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's concurring opin-
ion in Hudson cites Wisniewski to demonstrate that injury cognizable under the Eighth
Amendment should not be limited to physical injury. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1004 (Black-
mun, J., concurring).
172. See Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1002-03 (Blackmun, J., concurring). According to
Justice Blackmun, imposing a significant-injury requirement on the Eighth Amendment
might "not constrain prison officials from lashing prisoners with leather straps, whipping
them with rubber hoses, beating them with naked fists, shocking them with electric cur-
rents, asphyxiating them short of death, intentionally exposing them to undue heat or
cold, or forcibly injecting them with psychosis-inducing drugs." Id.
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force; 173 therefore, there was no need to balance the risk of injury
against a penological interest. That prison officials require wide
latitude in making security-related decisions has no logical bearing
in cases like Hudson, which involve completely gratuitous beat-
ings. 174 Applying the Whitley malicious-and-sadistic intent stan-
dard in such circumstances is untenable. 75
Moreover, a constitutional standard that requires a showing of
sadistic intent is inappropriate. Sadism is defined as "a type of
mental disease or disorder" that is manifested by "a form of satis-
faction, commonly sexual, derived from inflicting harm on an-
other.""' 6 The Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment must be acknowledged to prohibit more than sadistic
conduct.
As Justice Marshall argued in his dissent in Whitley, even a seri-
ous prison disturbance provides inadequate justification for "the
especially onerous standard" of malicious and sadistic intent. 177 In
addition, Justice Marshall concluded that the standard is particu-
larly inappropriate because courts deciding whether to apply it
would have to determine as a preliminary issue of fact whether the
disturbance presented a security risk, a question "that will often be
disputed and properly left to the jury."' 178 By collapsing all distinc-
tions between disturbances that present security risks and those
that do not, the Court's decision in Hudson essentially magnifies
the second of Justice Marshall's concerns and devalues the Eighth
Amendment.
As Justice Stevens suggests, in excessive force cases in which no
173. Id. at 997; see also supra note 102 and accompanying text. It is accepted prac-
tice to put maximum security prisoners in restraints before moving them. See Transcript,
supra note 93, at 12.
174. The Court's disregard for this essential point is surprising because Justice
O'Connor, who also wrote the Whitley majority opinion, had previously insisted on a
fact-specific approach to the Whitley standard. See Dudley v. Stubbs, 489 U.S. 1034,
1037-38 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing for applica-
tion of the Whitley standard to a case involving no use of force, on the ground that the
lower court acknowledged competing institutional concerns similar to those in Whitley).
In view of Justice O'Connor's close attention to the facts of Stubbs, Hudson's broad em-
brace of all use-of-force cases-including those involving gratuitous abuse--seems
inconsistent.
175. Even the officers conceded that although both the district and appellate courts
had determined that the officers "acted maliciously and sadistically," the lower "deliber-
ate indifference" standard would have been appropriate since "no balancing of important
governmental responsibilities existed." Brief of Respondents, supra note 98, at 20-21
n.13.
176. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1336 (6th ed. 1990).
177. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 328 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
178. Id.
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deference to prison officials is warranted, a finding of liability re-
quires a fact-intensive analysis, and the proper standard for the
analysis is "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. ' 179
Although this standard requires a prisoner to demonstrate that of-
ficials inflicted pain both unnecessarily and wantonly, in Hudson's
case, the issues blend together: Hudson's proof that the officials'
action served no legitimate purpose also proved that the action was
unnecessary and that the officials acted wantonly.
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF HUDSON
By overruling the significant-injury component of the standard
previously relied upon by the Fifth Circuit,s 0 Hudson made an im-
mediate impact on the Fifth Circuit's review of Eighth Amend-
ment excessive-force claims. In light of the holdings in Hudson,
the Fifth Circuit not only reinstated Hudson's damages on re-
mand,' but also remanded other Eighth Amendment prison
cases. 8 2  Since the previous standard was intended to control
docket management problems,8 3 Hudson will also result in the in-
creased access of prisoners to courts in the Fifth Circuit.
Although the objective prong of the Hudson holding in fact rati-
fied the standard applied in most lower federal courts, 8 4 the deci-
179. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1002 (Stevens, J., concurring). In determining whether
official actions are unnecessary and wanton, courts should consider four factors: (1) a
significant injury (2) resulting directly and only from the use of force that was (3) clearly
and unreasonably excessive, and that (4) caused an unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
The Supreme Court has recognized that although they do not provide a formula for de-
ciding cases, these factors provide a list of inquiries to focus the central inquiry-whether
the particular use of force amounts to unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. See
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 398 n.ll (1989).
180. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
181. See Hudson v. McMillian, 962 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1992).
182. See, e.g., Shabazz v. Lynaugh, 974 F.2d 597 (5th Cir. 1992); Tijerina v. Plentl,
958 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1992).
183. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Felix v. McCarthy, 939 F.2d 699, 702 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[I]t is not the
degree of injury which makes out a violation of the eighth amendment. Rather, it is the
use of official force or authority that is 'intentional, unjustified, brutal and offensive to
human dignity.' "); Campbell v. Grammer, 889 F.2d 797, 802 (8th Cir. 1989) (concluding
that because the spraying of inmates with high-powered fire hoses was intentional rather
than accidental and because the application of force was unjustified, the officers violated
the inmates' Eighth Amendment rights even though the inmates did not suffer severe
injuries); Williams v. Boles, 841 F.2d 181, 183 (7th Cir. 1988) ("The state is not free to
inflict.., pain without cause just so long as it is careful to leave no marks."); Burton v.
Livingston, 791 F.2d 97, 100 (8th Cir. 1986) ("[Tihe day has passed when an inmate must
show a court the scars of torture in order to make out a complaint."). But see Huguet v.
Barnett, 900 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1990) (requiring prisoners to prove "a significant
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sion not-'only cured the aberrational Fifth Circuit standard, but
also precluded the possibility that other courts would follow its
lead. However, the subjective prong of the Hudson standard re-
solved against prisoners a question that had divided the lower fed-
eral courts in several ways.185 The requirement of a showing of
malice is implicit in a standard that requires a showing of unjusti-
fied use of force, but the added burden of showing sadistic intent
will be difficult for prisoners to meet and for courts to apply.
VI. CONCLUSION
Constitutional inquiry that involves value-based notions, such as
"contemporary standards of decency" and acts that are "repug-
nant to the conscience of mankind," necessarily arouses debate.
Mirroring its two-prong Eighth Amendment analysis, the Supreme
Court approaches the formulation of Eighth Amendment stan-
dards with a two-prong inquiry: First, in light of Justice Powell's
admonition that "Eighth Amendment judgments should neither be
nor appear to be merely the subjective views' of judges,"' 86 the
Court's decision rests on clear objective reasoning. Second, in de-
fining the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punish-
ments, the Court's reasoning acknowledges that the subjective
values that inform "broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civi-
lized standards, humanity, and decency are useful and usable."'' 87
In Hudson v. McMillian, the Court decided that all but de
minimis uses of force are subject to Eighth Amendment scru-
tiny. 8 By eliminating the requirement that a prisoner must show
significant injury in order to prove an Eighth Amendment exces-
sive-force violation, .Hudson eases the prisoner's burden of proof.
injury" in order to prevail on an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim). The Fifth
Circuit followed its precedent in Huguet when ruling on Hudson's claim. See Hudson v.
McMillian, 929 F.2d 1014, 1015 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
185. See, e.g., Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1567 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that in
nonemergency situations, "deliberate indifference" is the proper standard); McHenry v.
Chadwick, 896 F.2d 184, 187 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that an Eighth Amendment viola-
tion occurs "if the infliction of pain upon a prisoner is both unnecessary and wanton," as
determined by "the reasons or motivation for the conduct, the type and excessiveness of
the force used, and the extent of the injury inflicted"); Unwin v. Campbell, 863 F.2d 124,
135 (1st Cir. 1988) ("[W]here institutional security is not at stake ... a plaintiff need not
prove malicious and sadistic intent."); Foulds v. Corley, 833 F.2d 52, 54 (5th Cir. 1987)
(declining to extend Whitley's "malicious and sadistic" standard when officials faced no
imminent danger).
186. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445
U.S. 263, 275 (1980)).
187. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968).
188. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1000.
[Vol. 24
Hudson v. McMillian
However, the subjective prong of the Hudson holding makes the
plaintiff's burden in Eighth Amendment cases more onerous. By
requiring that they prove that officials acted with malicious and
sadistic intent in order to establish an Eighth Amendment exces-
sive-force violation, Hudson effectively diminishes the Eighth
Amendment protection of prisoners. If courts sanction all but the
most invidious abuse against our nation's prisoners, one must ask
what this says about the "mood and temper" of our public
conscience. 89
BINA SANGHAVI
189. See text accompanying supra note 1.
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